This month marks the 50th anniversary of President Dwight Eisenhower’s decision to send federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to enforce court-ordered desegregation of the public schools. To commemorate this historic milestone, Kasey Pipes, who wrote speeches for President George W. Bush and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, has produced an informative and stirring book called, Ike’s Final Battle.
As Pipes tells the story, Eisenhower is Everyman in a morality play about securing racial justice in America. Born in Texas in 1890, and brought up in Abilene, Kansas, Eisenhower absorbed the prejudices common to Middle Americans of that era. But he also acquired a strong sense of decency, justice and fair play. In short, he combined the light and dark sides of American attitudes on race.
Eisenhower’s views on black Americans were dramatically altered by the courage displayed by his black troops during World War II. Initially, black soldiers were employed mainly as cooks and support personnel. But when the Germans launched a surprise offensive at the Battle of the Bulge, and Ike called for every able-bodied man in the Army, whatever his station, to volunteer to stem the tide, black soldiers surged forward even though they had no combat training. “[S]ome of them would die with a rifle in their hands they’d never fired before,” a deeply moved Ike would later recall. “[They] fought nobly for their country. And I will never forget.”
So Eisenhower came to the presidency resolved to do what he could to secure equal treatment for blacks.
For him, doing what he could meant completing the desegregation of the armed forces begun by Harry Truman and ending segregation in the District of Columbia and throughout federal government. Ike also appointed the first black staffer to the White House.
Naturally, there were many who hoped for more. Martin Luther King, who met face-to-face with Eisenhower on civil rights, said that his personal sincerity was pronounced, but “his conservatism was fixed and rigid, and any evil defacing the nation had to be extracted bit by bit with a tweezer because the surgeon’s knife was and instrument too radical to touch this best of all societies.”
Eisenhower’s approach to civil rights was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. He would lead no charges in public, but what one historian called his “hidden hand” was very much in evidence behind the scenes. He ordered his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, to file an amicus brief in support of the NAACP in the landmark school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education. He also played a covert role in ensuring the success of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which was organized by Martin Luther King after the arrest of Rosa Parks. One of King’s lieutenants was brilliant young lawyer named Fred Gray. Appreciating his value to King, the local Montgomery draft board decided to induct Gray into the Army. Eisenhower intervened through the National Selective Service System, which overruled the local board. Later, Eisenhower would send Congress the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction.
But if Eisenhower’s heart was in the right place, why didn’t he use the bully pulpit afforded him by the White House to do more for civil rights? According to speechwriter Pipes, Ike had little faith that speeches could accomplish anything. He once told a staffer that if the American people wanted a wordsmith as president, then “we ought to elect Ernest Hemingway.”
Then, as now, some people regarded his silence as apathy or even hostility toward the legitimate claims of black Americans. But as Pipes points out, if you compare Eisenhower’s stance on racial equality to that of his contemporaries, his stature grows rather than diminishes.
For example, Ike’s predecessor, Harry Truman, told a group of Yale University students around 1960 that he was proud of his civil rights record, “But personally, I don’t care to associate with n*gg*rs.” Adlai Stevenson, Ike’s rival for the White House in 1952, hoped to avoid taking a stand on civil rights during his second presidential bid in 1956 by proposing a one-year “moratorium” on demonstrations and legal action.
Lyndon Johnson, with his own eye on the presidency, supported Ike’s civil rights bill in 1957 while serving as a senator from Texas. But to remain in good graces with white southerners, he cynically undercut the measure by proposing an amendment that would require a trial by jury for anyone accused of a civil rights violation. Since at that time, “trial by jury” in the South meant trial by other white southerners, there was little chance that anyone who violated the law would go to jail. Furthermore, according to Robert Parker, Johnson’s bartender and chauffeur, LBJ was not above shoring up his standing with his racist Southern colleagues by addressing Parker as “n*gg*r,” whenever he took his Dixiecrat pals for rides in his limousine.
John Kennedy, also serving in the Senate at that time, voted for Johnson’s trial by jury amendment, later claiming that if he had not done so, the bill would have been filibustered to death. (When JFK ran for president in 1960, he tried to enlist the support of black baseball immortal, Jackie Robinson. Robinson complained that Kennedy wouldn’t look him in the eye, and ended up endorsing Richard Nixon, who had done more to promote the civil rights bill than Kennedy.)
This was what America was like when Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus attempted to defy the federal courts on integrating Little Rock public schools in September of 1957. Although Eisenhower had previously told reporters that he couldn’t imagine circumstances that would require him to send in federal troops, he did not hesitate to do so when all other means of persuasion failed. He would say later that his decision to do so ranked with D-Day as the toughest of his life.
John Kennedy would criticize Eisenhower for allowing the crisis in Little Rock to escalate to the point that federal troops were necessary. Yet five years later, when Kennedy faced his own confrontation with a racist governor over the integration of the University of Mississippi, he waited until 375 people had been wounded and two killed before sending in federal troops. In contrast, no one had died at Little Rock, and no one was seriously injured.
“In the final analysis,” concludes Kasey Pipes in the final pages of this remarkable book, “Eisenhower’s last, longest, and perhaps greatest battle was ultimately a struggle within himself. He had to overcome his own background and his own doubts. In the end, like every battle he ever waged, he fought it with his heart, mind, and soul. And like every battle he ever waged, in the end, he won.”